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I. UNWANTED SOLO: MOVING CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS INTO STEP WITH
COPYRIGHT

If all the arts are brothers,1 dance is the forgotten stepchild of
the family. The "black sheep"2 of the arts, dance has struggled to find
academic and legal recognition on par with its creative counterparts.
Throughout the history of U.S. copyright protection, dance has
consistently been an afterthought. Although Congress passed the first
copyright law in 1790, 3 copyright did not explicitly protect
choreographic works until 1976. 4 The 1909 Copyright Act only
protected pieces of choreography that could be registered by the
author as a type of "dramatic composition." 5 This relegation to a
subset-of-a- subset aptly characterizes the ongoing academic and
artistic search for an ontology 6 of dance separate from other, more
established art forms such as music or theater. The academic study of
dance remains "a relatively new (and chronically underfunded) field of
7
educational study and research."
Dancers and choreographers consistently feel frustration with
the state of the copyright laws in the United States, 8 while lawyers
chafe against the perceived lack of effort choreographers make to
conform their work to the statutory requirements. Only those
choreographic works that are "fixed" may be copyrighted 9 : demanding

JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
1.
CULTURAL TREASURES 197 (1999) (quoting the Abb6 Gr6goire).
2.
Barbara A. Singer, In Search of Adequate Protection for Choreographic Works:
Legislativ and Judicial Alternatives vs. the Custom of the Dance Community, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 287, 288 (1984).
3.
Benjamin W. Rudd, Notable Dates in American Copyright 1783-1969, 28 Q.J. LIBR.
CONGRESS 137, 138 (1971), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf.
4.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a)(4), 90 Stat. 2541, 2545 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (2006)).
5.
1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5(d), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, superseded by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006)) [hereinafter 1909 Act].
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6.
7.

DANCE HERITAGE COALITION, STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE OF DANCE-

RELATED MATERIALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LIBRARIANS, ARCHIVISTS, CURATORS, AND OTHER
COLLECTIONS STAFF 4 (2009), available at http://www.danceheritage.orgfDHCfairuse_
statement.pdf.
See generally infra Part III (noting the tension between the goal of protecting creative
8.
works and the practical need of choreographers and dancers to build upon certain basic steps, as
well as the works of others).
9.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1: COPYRIGHT
BASICS 3 (2011) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1], availableat http://www.copyright.
gov/circs/circOl.pdf (stating that copyright does not protect "works that have not been fixed in a
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either a video recording, which glosses over much of a work's nuance, 10
or a specially notated version of the choreography, often costing more
than the work is able to generate.1 '
In recent years, the importance of copyright protection for
choreographic works has skyrocketed for both artistic and commercial
reasons. Dance's emergence as an art form that demands increasing
recognition based upon its own artistic merit has substantial
implications for its legal protection. Throughout the twentieth
century, choreographers created works that pushed the boundaries of
established conceptions of movement. Their works played an integral
role in the crafting of social consciousness at many pivotal moments in
American history. 12 These pioneers of the modern dance movement are
aging rapidly: a few have died in the last decade' 3 and many are in
advanced age and declining health. Some of the works created by
these choreographers are financially significant, and almost all
contain artistic significance that will breed litigation over their
performance rights and the economic consequences that follow.
Commercial exploitation of choreographic works has increased14
exponentially as dance grabs a place in American pop culture.
Television shows such as Dancing with the Stars and So You Think
tangible form of expression (for example, choreographic works that have not been notated or
)").
recorded ....
10. Another traditional argument against video recording is that the two-dimensional
nature of the recording results in an incomplete record of the work. With the rise of threedimensional television, it is possible that video recording will become a more widely appreciated
method of fixation. These technological advances will only add to the continuing viability of the
fixation requirement.
11. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2, at 291 ("[B]ecause paying audiences are small, while
production costs are high, most choreographers and dancers are seriously underpaid.").
12. Concerts given at Judson Memorial Church beginning in 1962 made the church
synonymous with art that pushed the boundaries, moving dance from structured storylines and
balletic steps to movements that encapsulated the more average human condition. It was a
collaboration between dance and other social progressions: the church housed the first drug
treatment facility in Greenwich Village, operated an abortion clinic prior to Roe v. Wade, and
provided interracial, international housing well before it was socially acceptable to do so. See
History: Overview, JUDSON MEMORIAL CHURCH, http://www.judson.org/History (last visited Mar.
13, 2012).
13. Martha Graham and Merce Cunningham are two of the most significant losses. See
Anna Kisselgoff, Martha Graham Dies at 96; A Revolutionary in Dance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991,
Graham's
(announcing
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/generallonthisdaybday/051 1.html
death and setting forth her accomplishments); Alastair Macaulay, Merce Cunningham, Dance
Visionary, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/artstdance
/28cunningham.html (announcing Cunningham's death and setting forth his accomplishments).
14. See Joi Michelle Lakes, Note, A Pas de Deux for Choreographyand Copyright, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1829, 1829 (2005) (stating that many of America's most memorable cultural iconsincluding Fred Astaire, Ginger Rogers, and Madonna-have been dancers).
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You Can Dance skyrocketed dance into the realm of primetime
audiences and hit reality television shows.15 The Emmy Awards
recently
began
recognizing
achievements
in outstanding
choreography. 16 Media industry titans Walt Disney, Inc. and
Twentieth Century Fox already hold production rights in dance
shows. 17 In combination with the like-titled song, Beyonc6's Single
Ladies dance took the Internet, dance studios, and popular culture by
storm and spawned numerous takeoffs, each of which utilized not just
the music and lyrics, but the choreography as well.' 8 As corporate
interest in dance as a moneymaking enterprise continues to grow, it
will become more important to develop a clearly defined system for
establishing legal rights and ownership in choreographic works.
The definition of the ontology of dance has shifted distinctly in
the forty-five years since the 1976 Copyright Act passed, and the issue
of copyright protection for choreographic work is ripe for review. This
Note provides a theoretical justification for retaining the statutory
fixation requirement for choreographic works while demonstrating
how this seemingly limiting prerequisite honors the customs and goals
of the art form and effectively promotes natural rights in a way that

15. See 'Dancingwith the Stars' Finale Gets Huge Ratings, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24,
2010,
12:58
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/24/dancing-with-the-starsfi-l-n_788177.html (recounting the ratings from the fall 2010 finale, which drew twenty-six
million viewers); SO YOU THINK YOU CAN DANCE, www.fox.com/dance (last visited Mar. 13, 2012)
(branching out from a dance show to a tour and foundation). MTV also embraced the dance
trend, focusing on street dancing with its show America's Best Dance Crew, which was renewed
for a sixth season in November 2010. Robert Seidman, MTVRenews 'America'sBest Dance Crew'
for Sixth Season; Premieres in April 2011, TV BY THE NUMBERS (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://tvbythenumbers.zap2it.com/2010/11/22/mtv-renews-americas-best-dance-crew-for-sixthseason-premieres-in-april-2011/73040.
16. 2010 Emmy Nominations: Outstanding Choreography, EMMYS, http://www.emmys.com/
nominations?tid=108 (search "2010" for "year" and search "choreography" for "category"). Four
choreographic works from So You Think You Can Dance and Dancing with the Stars were
nominated in 2010. Id.
17. The aforementioned Dancing with the Stars (ABC) and So You Think You Can Dance
(Fox) are owned by The Walt Disney Company and News Corporation (the parent company of
Fox), respectively. See Company Overview, WALT DISNEY COMPANY, http://corporate.
disney.go.com/corporate/overview.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012); Ww Owns What, COLUMBIA
JOURNALISM REV. (July 27, 2011), http://www.cjr.org/resources/?c--newscorp.
18. It is worth noting that this choreography bears a striking similarity to the work of
prominent twentieth century choreographer Bob Fosse, specifically his work "Mexican
Breakfast." A brief visual comparison reveals the similarities, but more significantly, Beyonc6
herself gave multiple interviews acknowledging that she drew heavily on inspiration from Fosse.
See Beyonce Confirmed That Single Ladies Video Was Indeed Inspired by Broadway
Choreographer Bob Fosse, YOUTUBE (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-eSlfHHd3qI.
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many critics feel is missing from American copyright law. 19 Although
choreographers bemoan the fact that recorded or notated versions of
choreographic works do not effectively capture the "soul" of the work
and are therefore inherently unsatisfying, the fixation requirement is
20
necessary to avoid inappropriate constraints on a natural right. Part
II provides a general history of copyright and dance. Part III analyzes
the theoretical and practical reasons for the fixation requirement by
drawing parallels to recent sports cases to demonstrate the significant
link between access to movement and the progress of the art form.
Part III then discusses the traditional acceptance of "stealing steps"
and positions fixation as a desirable mechanism for respecting the
culture and practices of the art form. Part IV expands on the need to
retain the fixation requirement for choreographic works established in
Part III and showcases how this requirement furthers the interests of
both choreographers and the public.
II. REHEARSAL: How CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS GAINED THEIR PLACE
WITHIN COPYRIGHT LAW
It is important to analyze the effectiveness of the current
copyright regime in light of the history of copyright treatment of
dance. Dancers mature artistically through a culture that, while
encouraging of innovation, relies on codification of training and a
consciously self-referential bent to craft the raw materials necessary
for the art form. This Part first gives a brief overview of the evolution
of American copyright law and its goals and then addresses why
copyright protection is necessary for choreographic works. It concludes
by outlining the deficiencies of the currently available protection.

19. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985) (arguing for strong protections for artists' moral rights
and summarizing the problems that arise from failing to recognize these interests). See generally
Susan P. Liemer, UnderstandingArtists'Moral Rights: A Primer,7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 56-57
(1998) (urging protection for moral rights because of the significant societal role of artistic
endeavors).
20. I use the term "natural right" to describe the Lockean idea of those rights which man
receives from nature (or God) and which inhere in all mankind. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
ON GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). Here, I specifically mean the ability of humans to
manipulate their bodies in all movements that they can physically achieve.
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A. Learning the Fundamentals:Building a Repertoire of Copyright
Law
Like so many facets of American law, U.S. copyright law has a
decidedly British lineage. 21 America's first copyright act closely
followed the British Statute of Anne, a law promulgated primarily to
regulate trade in the written word. 22 The Framers of the Constitution
recognized the importance of protecting intellectual creations,
inserting a clause that gave Congress the right "[t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." 23 The so-called "intellectual property clause"
animated congressional concern for copyright protection.
From its earliest conception, American copyright law has been
driven by theories of economic utilitarianism. 24 This economic
motivation traces to English ideas about the role of copyright. The
Statute of Anne granted exclusive printing rights to authors of new
literary works "for the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose
and Write," 25 in order to provide an economic incentive for authors to
combat a market monopoly that the British government viewed as
harmful. 26 Likewise, its American progeny embodies "the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors." 27 In
1945, noted American judicial scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
21. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1968).
22. Id. at 14.
8.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.
24. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/
("Utilitarianism
aligns
events.medialExpressiveIncentives_in_IntellectuaLProperty.pdf
fluently with (and is frequently justified in strong part by) the U.S. Constitution's grant of power
to Congress '[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' "); see
also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("By establishing
a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ").
25. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com
/anne.html.
26. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 143 ("It [the Statute of Anne] was a trade-regulation
statute enacted to bring order to the chaos .. .and to prevent a continuation of the booksellers'
monopoly.").
27. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
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expounded the underlying rationale of copyright, explaining: "We do
not expect that much of the . . .art which we desire can be produced
by men who possess independent means or who derive their living
28
from other occupations .... [s]o we resort to a monopoly."
The monopoly Chafee described is a limited monopoly for a
limited time.29 Congress granted property rights to creators of original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression for the
life of the author plus seventy years. 30 The 1976 Copyright Act
protects original works of authorship including the categories of: (1)
literary works, (2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works, (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works, (7) sound recordings,
and (8) architectural works. 3 1 However, Congress recognized the
limitations that would result if authors could copyright the "building
blocks" of their works-no work is created in a vacuum, and if
monopolies eat up all available ideas, innovation quickly disappears.
For this reason, the law excludes ideas, processes, facts, concepts, and
like categories from copyright protection. 32 Section 102 of the 1976 Act
expressly states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work." 33 This is the most significant limitation to
copyright protection. 34 As this Note addresses in Part IV, the same
principle that protects facts from monopolization supports
maintaining the fixation requirement in the case of choreographic
works.
The inability to assert ownership over facts or ideas limits all
authors in an evenhanded way. However, the equity of this restriction
is not illustrative of all aspects of copyright law. In the case of
choreographic works, the fixation requirement proves to be a second,
28. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507
(1945).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.8.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
31. Id. § 102(a).
32. Id. § 102(b).
33. Id.; see also COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that
copyright protection does not extend to mere listings of ingredients or contents, ideas,
procedures, methods, systems, processes, concepts, principles, discoveries, or devices, and other
works consisting entirely of information that is common property).
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (stating
34. See, e.g.,
that it is a settled principle of law that facts are not copyrightable).
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significant limitation. 35 Section 101 of the 1976 Act specifies that a
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when "its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration." 36 It is worth noting at this point that many-if
not most-countries have no comparable fixation formality. 37 One of
the major international intellectual property agreements, 38 the Berne
Convention ("Berne"), forbids the precluding of copyright protection on
the basis of formalities (for example, whether an author has published
a work). 39 However, fixation does not fit within this ban: Berne
explicitly states that "[i]t shall, however, be a matter for legislation in
the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any
specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have
been fixed in some material form." 40 The United States has chosen to
maintain a fixation requirement for a variety of reasons, many
actually beneficial to authors of choreographic works.
Although the United States' retention of a fixation requirement
remains fairly unique within the international community, it is not an
arbitrary construction. The (at least) semipermanence necessitated by
the fixation requirement is the congressional answer to the
constitutional requirement that a limited exclusionary right be
granted for "writings."41 Traditionally, courts have felt that the choice
of the word "writings" connoted something tangible and capable of
reproduction. 42 Contrary to fixation's popular characterization-

35. Singer, supra note 2, at 301.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
37. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 47 (3d ed.
2010).
38. The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the
TRIPS Agreement are also important documents in the field of international copyright
protection. Id.
39. See Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, Sept. 9, 1886
(as amended Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.
int/treaties/ernip/berne/trtdocswo001.html#P19_78 ("The enjoyment and the exercise of these
rights shall not be subject to any formality.
40. Id. at art. 2.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.8.
42. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The concept of
fixation suggests that works are not copyrightable unless reduced to some tangible form. If the
word 'writings' is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote some
material form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance."); see
also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (" '[WIritings' . .. may be interpreted to
include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.").
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especially in dance circles-as an arbitrarily imposed construction,
legislative history reveals that the fixation requirement emerged in
reaction to a perceived failure by the courts to protect authors'
rights.43 In White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the Supreme
Court held that a player-piano roll was not a copy because the music
was reproduced by a machine rather than a human. 44 The Court's
inflexible approach caused Congress to worry that technological
advances would erode copyright protection. 4 5 In response, Congress
inserted language in section 102, requiring fixation and allowing it to
take any workable form, even if that form was unknown in 1976.46
The addition of the fixation requirement was not the only
change Congress made in 1976. Prior to passage of the 1976 Copyright
Act, choreographic works did not qualify for protection on their own
merit, but rather only fit into the statutory regime if they could be
characterized as "dramatic" works. 47 This lack of specificity invited
judicial determination of artistic merit-judges could decline to extend
protection if they merely didn't like the dance-which became
increasingly untenable as dance gained recognition in the United
States throughout the twentieth century. The more widely accepted an
art form, the more likely it becomes that arbitrary decisions that
decline to follow the copyright law's stated agnosticism toward artistic
value will draw ire from those parties with a creative and/or economic
interest at stake.
B. Immoral, Nondramatic, Unprotected. Dance Priorto the 1976Act
Movement is universally human: unlike languages, where
translational difficulties create significant barriers between peoples,
movement is intelligible across social and cultural backgrounds. In the
same way that the academic community has struggled to identify
dance's place vis-h-vis the other performing arts, the judiciary has
been unable to avoid passing value judgments in cases involving
choreographic works. Although copyright protection nominally does
not depend on the artistic merit of the work, the unsettled place of
choreographic works within the copyright laws allowed judicial

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665.
17 U.S.C. §102(a) (2006).
1909 Act §5(d).
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overreaching through rulings based on aesthetic and/or moral value
judgments.
In 1867, the California circuit court declined to protect a piece
of choreography as a "dramatic... composition[ ]"48 because it felt the
ballet consisted primarily of "women lying around loose," and "[t]o call
such a spectacle a 'dramatic composition' is an abuse of language, and
an insult to the genius of the English drama." 49 The court justified the
ruling by opining, "[I]t is the duty of all courts to uphold public virtue,
and discourage and repel whatever tends to impair it."50 Ironically, the
ballet "The Black Crook" was later credited for helping to revive
American interest in ballet, typically considered a rather staid art
51
form.
In the late 1800s, choreography was particularly susceptible to
dismissal based on subjective quality determinations. This is, perhaps,
not surprising given the intimate connection between movement and
human sexuality. When defining dramatic dance, a New York court
held that movements designed to convey "no other idea than that a
comely woman is illustrating the poetry of motion" Were not within the
53
statutory definition of "dramatic composition." 52 Circular 51, issued
by the Copyright Office to provide general information about copyright
protection in choreographic works under the 1909 Copyright Act,
defined choreographic work as "a ballet or similar theatrical work
which tells a story[,] develops a character, or expresses a theme or54
emotion by means of specific dance movements and physical actions."
Lack of statutorily enumerated protection for choreographic
works gave judges substantial room to work outside of the statutory
scope of "literary" or "dramatic" works. This wiggle room conflicts with
Justice Holmes's admonition against judicial value judgments set

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9173).
Id.

51. PEGGY VAN PRAAGH & PETER BRINSON, THE CHOREOGRAPHIC ART: AN OUTLINE OF ITS
PRINCIPLES AND CRAFT 94 (1963).

52. Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
53. The Copyright Office routinely issues circulars and factsheets to provide general
information about various aspects of U.S. copyright law. It is worth noting that Circular 51 is no
longer included on the Copyright Office website. See Information Circulars and Factsheets, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
54. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 96 (Comm. Print

1961) (authored by Borge Varmer) [hereinafter Study 28], available at http://www.copyright.gov
/history/studies/study28.pdf. Circular 51 went on to reiterate that "[t]he dance must convey a
dramatic concept or idea." Id.
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forth in the canonical copyright case Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographic Co.: "If [artistic works] command the interest of any
public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that
they have not an aesthetic and education value-and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt." 55 If the courts had held true
to Holmes's admonition, the discounting of artistic merit based on
subjective moral judgment might have been avoided.
When choreographers were successful in their pursuit of
protection, it was often because they took the extra step of modifying
the choreography into another form. For example, in 1953,
choreographer Ruth Page copyrighted her Beethoven Sonata as a
56
literary work by writing a book of detailed instructions for the work.
Page was the first choreographer to choose this route, compelled by
judicial exclusion of nondramatic ballets under the 1909 Act.5 7 Page's
success was a hollow victory, however, as the Copyright Office warned
her that it expressed no opinion as to whether unauthorized
performance of the choreography would constitute infringement of the
58
book.
Conversely, at least one judge was swayed by a work's success
and granted copyright protection without any concrete connection
between the work and a dramatic composition. Although Hanya
Holm's choreography from the musical Kiss Me Kate does not tell a
story within its choreography, it received protection as a "dramatic
work," likely due to a combination of the musical's story and the
show's financial success.5 9 Contemporaneous observers attributed this
decision to the increased recognition of Labanotation 60 as a viable

55. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (chastising
judges not to insert their own artistic preferences for the boundaries of the law: "It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
56. See Anatole Chujoy, New Try Made to Copyright Choreography, DANCE NEWS, Feb.
1953, at 4.
57. 1909 Act §5(d).
58. Lakes, supra note 14, at n.51.
59. See Leon Mirell, Legal Protection for Choreography, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 792, 810-11
(1952) (positing that the Copyright Office may have been familiar with the dances from seeing or
remembering the dances performed).
60. Labanotation is. the most well-respected method of notating dance. It requires
significant training to decipher, but if trained, a reader can extrapolate from a single symbol on a
staff: (i) the direction of the movement, (ii) the part of the body doing'the movement, (iii) the
level of the movement, and (iv) the length of time it takes to do the movement. Labanotation
Basics, DANCE NOTATION BUREAU, http://www.dancenotation.org/lnbasics/frameO.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2012). In addition to the cost and perceived imperfection of the methods of fixing
choreography, it has been suggested that choreographers worried that fixation would decrease
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notation format and Holm's willingness to spend the time and money
notating her work. 61 However, it seems that there may have been
more subjective judgments at play in Holm's case given that other
musical choreographers were not as lucky.
Agnes de Mille created some of the seminal musical ballets.
Her dream ballet sequence from Oklahoma! is one of the pivotal
moments of the show and has been reproduced countless times in
various versions, including successful main stage revivals that poured
royalties into the pockets of the show's creators. 62 Yet, de Mille did not
reap the economic incentives ostensibly provided by the copyright
statute. In her own words, "Rodgers and Hammerstein got me $50 a
week for the twenty-seven-and-a-half minutes of dance I composed for
Oklahoma!, but no royalties. After five years, it was raised to $75 a
week and some more money from the touring company." 63 In the years
after Oklahoma!, de Mille pled for the chance to take ownership of her
work as one of the loudest voices in the call for the inclusion of
64
choreographic works in the copyright statute.
The twentieth century brought an explosion of dance in
America: vaudeville performers lit up Broadway's Great White Way,
the movie musical rose to prominence, and American choreography
truly began to come of age. Legal recognition through explicit
codification represented an important step in the growth of the art
form and was accomplished with the passage of the 1976 Copyright
Act.

the author's control over his work. See Mirell, supra note 59, at 793 ("If there has been reluctance
to record the dance on the part of the choreographer, it has been due in no small degree, to his
feeling that such recording merely increases the likelihood of plagiarism and piracy.").
61. Anthea Kraut, "Stealing Steps" and Signature Moves: Embodied Theories of Dance as
IntellectualProperty, 62 THEATRE J. 173, 177 n.i8 (2010).
62. A 2010 revival performed in Washington, D.C. broke records in tickets sales and earned
rave reviews from critics who suggested it might make a run to the Broadway stage. Patrick
Healy, 'Oklahoma!'Revival in D.C. Generates Broadway Buzz, ARTS BEAT, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10,
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/oklahoma-revival-in-d-c2010),
available at
generates-broadway -buzz/.
63. Hilary Osterle, Indomitable Spirit, BALLET NEWS 11, 16 (Sept. 1983) (quoting Agnes de
Mille).
64. See Study 28, supra note 54, at 110 ("Give us some chance to protect our basic rights
and we will settle all other difficulties ourselves.").
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C. Hardly Settled: Introduction of ChoreographicWorks to the
American Copyright Regime
Legal theorist L. Ray Patterson said of copyright law that
"[t]he modern concept of copyright is difficult, complex, and on the
the
whole,
unsatisfactory." 65
This
statement
encapsulates
dissatisfaction often felt by choreographers who resent the forced
adherence to a requirement that is admittedly more onerous for them
than for other authors 66 whose areas of work lend themselves more
readily to, or even demand, fixation. 67 Adapting one law to cover a
myriad of art forms is challenging. Throughout its history, American
copyright law has suffered from a fundamental disconnect between
the concept intended and the reality of the law's application. 68 The
legislative history and inquiry leading up to the passage of the 1976
Copyright Act indicate a desire to protect choreographic works. 69
Forty-six years after its passage, it is time to question whether it has
achieved its goal.
Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines the relevant
terms from the statute. 70 Noticeably missing from the collection of
fifty-five definitions is an exposition of the term "choreographic
work."7 1 The legislative history supporting the Act states that the
term was deliberately undefined because it already had a "fairly
settled meaning." 72 However, closer examination of the correct level of
copyright protection for choreographic works reveals that the meaning

65. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 8.
66. While it may feel more appropriate to refer to these creators as artists, "author" is a
term of art for creator in copyright law and used here as such.
67. See Singer, supranote 2, at 301 ("Because dance is, in essence, an intangible work of art
that lives primarily through performance instead of through recordation, the fixation
requirement creates a formidable obstacle to the registration of choreographic works."); see also
Kathleen Abitabile & Jeanette Picerno, Dance and the Choreographer'sDilemma: A Legal and
Cultural Perspective on Copyright Protectionfor Choreographic Works, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 39,
40 (2004) ("It is very hard to gain intellectual property rights for choreography because of the
abstract nature of dance.").
68. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 144 ("The distinction between the two concepts-the
one intended and the one which resulted-was fundamental.").
69. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5665-67.
70.

17 U.S.C. § 101.

71.
72.

Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666-67.
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of "choreography" has been as hard to define as the art form of dance
73
itself.
When Congress passed the 1909 Copyright Act, most
choreographic works followed the "story ballet tradition,"74 at least in
the sense that the works crafted their movement around a storyline.
These works fit relatively easily into the protected category of
dramatic works.7 5 However, as the twentieth century progressed,
dance began to break away from the traditional boundaries imposed
by its close association with theater and music. 7 6 This evolution
highlighted a growing divide between the art form and the law that
77
purported to promote its progress.
In the 1950s, the Copyright Office commissioned a program for
the comprehensive reexamination of copyright law with an eye to its
revision.7 8 As part of this program, Attorney-Advisor to the Copyright
Office, Borge Varmer, submitted an October 1959 report entitled
"Study No. 28 Copyright in Choreographic Work," in which he makes
a case for the explicit inclusion of choreographic works in the new
copyright act. 79 Varmer begins by introducing and defining the term

73. Webster's Dictionary defines "ontology" as "the branch of metaphysics dealing with the
nature of being." Due to dance's ephemeral nature, interested scholars struggle with how to
pinpoint the underlying nature of dance, its sense of being. Yvonne Rainer's call for a "pure
dance" has been embraced by many as an ontology of dance-a way to define dance separately
from other art forms. See Noel Carroll, Theater, Dance, and Theory: A Philosophical Narrative,
15 DANCE CHRON. 317, 318 (1992) (describing Rainer's declaration against perceived flaws of
theater and their overlap with dance).
74. See JENNIFER HOMANS, APOLLO'S ANGELS: A HISTORY OF BALLET 171 (2010) ("The pull
between a central woman (supported by a large and sympathetic corps de ballet) and her lover,
between the demands of the community and the secret desires of the individual, would structure
ballet for over a century . .
75. 1909 Act § 5(d).
76. For example, Merce Cunningham famously formed his choreography through games of
chance, exploring sound motifs or ideas devoid of a traditional storyline or musical score.
Vanessa Kam, Merce Cuningham in conversation with John Rockwell, STANFORD PRESIDENTIAL
LECTURES IN THE HUMANITIES AND ARTS (2005), http://prelectur.stanford.eduflecturers/
cunningham/ ("Some people seem to think that it is inhuman and mechanistic to toss pennies in
creating a dance instead of chewing the nails or beating the head against a wall or thumbing
through old notebooks for ideas. But the feeling I have when I compose in this way is that I am
in touch with a natural resource far greater than my own personal inventiveness could ever be,
much more universally human than the particular habits of my own practice, and organically
rising out of common pools of motor impulses.").
77. See Mirell, supra note 59, at 792 ("The creator of the dance, the choreographer, performs
an artistic and intellectual function equal to that of the music composer or literary writer.
Despite this cultural fact and the admitted economic value of choreographic creations, the rights
of the choreographer in his work have never been clearly defined.").
78. Study 28, supra note 54, at III.
79. Id. at 100-04.
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"choreographic works," which he says is commonly understood as
referring to "those more intricate dances, such as ballets, devised for
execution by skilled performers for the enjoyment of an audience."8 0 As
used in the context of copyright, the term may refer "both to the dance
itself as a conception of its author to be performed for an audience,
and to the graphic representation of the dance in the form of symbols
or other writing from which it may be comprehended and
performed."81
In the 1960s, the question remained whether copyright law
should protect choreographic works at all. Members of the dance
community were not customary members of the legal community.
Scholar Jessica Litman notes that choreographers did not attend the
Copyright Office's 1960s conferences, positing that they "had no
representatives to send." 82 Judging from the responses to Varmer's
study, it appears that this is not entirely accurate. 8 3 Varmer's
solicitation for comments on his report received substantial response
from prominent choreographers. These comments offered widely
divergent definitions of "choreographic works" and even disagreed on
the baseline question of whether choreography should be
copyrightable.
A few examples illuminate the differences. A well-known voice
in copyright debates of the era, John Schulman,84 suggested tying the
extent of copyright protection for choreography to the extent it is
reducible to a tangible form (i.e., fixed). 85 Foreshadowing the
controversy to follow, Schulman commented that economic concern "is
only one of the lesser aspects of the problem." 86 For most
choreographers, the likelihood of substantial economic gain is slight,

80. Id. at 93.
81. Id.
82. Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275,
312 (1989).
83. See Study 28, supra note 54, at 109-16 (laying out the various viewpoints of
commentators).
84. Schulman was counsel to the Song Writers' Protective Association and had earlier urged
lawmakers to treat copyright in the same way they treated tangible property such as real estate
or a car. General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before the Comm. on Patents, 72d
Cong. 82-83 (1932) (statement of John Schulman, Counsel, Song Writers' Protective
Association).
85. Study 28, supra note 54, at 109.
86. Id. at 110.
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and the more important issue is creative control. 87 This concern is less
easily met by U.S. copyright law's focus on maximizing the economic
88
aspects of invention and progress.
The exclusion of choreographic works from copyright law
suggested that dance had no independent identity-to the deep
chagrin of the dance community. Agnes de Mille wrote passionately
that choreography "is neither drama nor storytelling. It is a separate
art."8 9 She defined choreography as "an arrangement in time-space,
using human bodies as its unit of design." 90 In her definition, all
inherited folk steps, classical ballet techniques, and basic tap devices
are public domain, but the combination-good or bad-should be
copyrightable. 9 1 De Mille's response glossed over the issue of fixation,
pleading, "Give us some chance to protect our basic rights and we will
92
settle all other difficulties ourselves."
Other commentators seem to accept the concept of fixation: the
"dean of American dance critics,"93 John Martin, admitted that some
recording is clearly required of any work to establish rights.94 A
choreographer might decline to fix his or her work, but Martin viewed
this choice as on par with a musician who declines to use musical
notation or a poet who refuses to learn how to read and write. 95 Martin
intuited that concerns for the art form's posterity demanded some
method of preservation. Tying this to the baseline for obtaining a legal
96
right incentivizes this preservation.
Not all artistic minds supported extending copyright protection
to choreographic works. New York City Ballet founder, Lincoln
Kirstein, concisely dismissed the need for protection for choreographic
87. See Singer, supra note 2, at 304 n.80 ("Mhe primary interest of choreographers in
maintaining the artistic integrity of their works conflicts with the Copyright Act's favoring of
economic benefits at the expense of artistic concerns.").
88. See id. at 305 ("A dance lives primarily through a dancer's interpretation. The
choreographer, therefore, will be vitally concerned with the circumstances surrounding each
performance of his work.").
89. Study 28, supra note 54, at 110.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93.

John Joseph Martin, AM. NAT'L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, http://www.anb.org/articles/18/18-

00796.html?a=l&n=john%2joseph%2martin&d=l0&ss=O&q=1 (last visited May 7, 2012).
94. Study 28, supranote 54, at 111.
95. Id. at 112.
96. Concerns about preservation predate Varmer's Study 28. See, e.g., Mirell, supra note 59,
at 793 (' The defining of the rights of the choreographer in his works would foster the recording of
choreography and, thereby develop the art form by preserving and offering for study and training
masterpieces of dance creativity.").
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works: "Since choreography does not have a generally legible
language, since even ballet masters forget their own works within a
few years, and since the actual available or useful repertory is dead of
its own exhaustion every decade, I see no practical attempts at
protection."9 7 Kirstein betrayed his own artistic preferences, declaring
categorically that not even two choreographers in a generation create
work worth copying. 98 Such artistic snobbery directly contradicts
copyright's consistent, aspirational attempts to avoid subjective
artistic judgments.
In the end, Congress went ahead with its planned inclusion of
choreographic works. The Register's Report of 1961 made clear that
the "fairly settled meaning" of "choreography" included nondramatic
works:
Treating choreographic works as a species of "dramatic compositions" [under the 1909
Act], has one serious shortcoming. Many choreographic works present "abstract" dance
movements in which, aside from their aesthetic appeal, no story or specific theme is
readily apparent. Whether such "abstract" dances qualify as "dramatic compositions" is
uncertain. We see no reason why an "abstract" dance, as an original creation of a
choreographer's authorship, should not be protected as fully as a traditional ballet
99
presenting a story or theme.

The Copyright Office currently defines "choreography" as "the
composition and arrangement of dance movements and patterns
usually intended to be accompanied by music."'0 0 Notably, copyright
protects choreography regardless of whether a storyline is present.'0 '
Like publication, presentation before an audience is no longer
required. 10 2 The legislative history surrounding the passage of the
1976 Act clarifies that the range of protected works does not include
social dance steps or simple routines. 10 3 The Copyright Office cautions

97. Study 28, supra note 54, at 113.
98. Id.
99. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 17 (Copyright Law Revision Part 1) (Comm.
Print 1961).
100. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FL 119 DRAMATIC WORKS: SCRIPTS, PANTOMIMES AND
CHOREOGRAPHY (2010) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FACTSHEET 119], available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fll19.html.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666-67
(stating it was not necessary "to specify that 'choreographic works' do not include social dance
steps and simple routines"). The term "social dance steps" is undefined and outside the scope of
this Note. As the Internet makes it possible for a dance to go viral instantly and take its place in
popular culture, it is interesting to consider whether popularity on such a huge scale could move
a piece of choreography into the realm of "social dance" thereby depriving it of copyright
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that the interaction between choreography and fixation may mean
that "the minimal requirement of creativity generally necessary to
copyright protection is somewhat greater in its application to dance
steps and routines."'10 4 Such heightened standards protect the
interests of the public in maintaining a body of movement that is
universally available. Dance may struggle to stake its place in the
pantheon of academically and socially respected art forms, but
movement is fundamentally important as an integral part of the
human experience.
In 1959, Borge Varmer urged Congress to grant copyright
protection to choreographic works on the basis that, due to the
increasing use of choreography as a medium for public entertainment
in motion pictures, television, and on stage, the question of copyright
protection for choreography was becoming a matter of "increasing
importance."' 10 5 More than fifty years later, dance is breaking into the
mainstream in an even more significant way. It is time to reevaluate
the correct balance between protection of intellectual property and
preservation of the movements that unite human heritage.

III. DEFINING "CHOREOGRAPHIC WORK" VIS-A-VIS OTHER STEPS,
FORMATIONS, AND TRADITIONS
Recent years have seen an emerging commercial interest in
dance demonstrated in reality television shows such as Dancing with
the Stars and So You Think You Can Dance, viral videos grounded in
dance, and an increased potential for litigation as the choreographic
greats age. Nevertheless, there has been very little actual litigation
over copyright infringement of choreographic works. Choreographers
have historically demonstrated an aversion to litigation. It is unclear
whether this aversion springs from a disdain for the copyright law,
from a trust in community norms, or from a mere recognition that it is
fiscally ineffective to bring suit. Regardless, there have only been two
major lawsuits involving copyright in a choreographic work since the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, neither of which dealt with the
appropriateness of the fixation requirement as applied to

protection at the exact point that this protection is most valuable. I plan to address this question
in a later work.
104. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.07(B) (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2010).
105. Study 28, supra note 54, at 94.
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choreographic works. 10 6 Due to a lack of precedent, it is necessary to
analogize to other forms of movement in order to analyze relevant
jurisprudence. Courts and commentators have analyzed movements
by athletes in greater depth than they have choreography: sports and
athlete rights have been highly litigated, due in large part to the high
economic stakes.
This Part first demonstrates how jurisprudence denying
copyright protection to individual athletic performance and game
strategy provides a concrete legal basis for retaining the fixation
requirement for choreographic works. It then utilizes the traditional
practice within the tap dance community of "stealing steps" to
highlight the counterintuitive compatibility of fixation with an open
culture of artistic education. In addition, this Part addresses multiple
arguments for favoring modifications to the current system,
highlighting both general and specific benefits inherent in sustaining
and augmenting the current regime.
A. The Danceras an Athlete: Using CurrentSports Jurisprudenceto
Guide Copyright Protectionfor ChoreographicWorks
Movement not only forms the building blocks of a
choreographic work, it is also the raw material that feeds the ability of
the dancer. The Second Circuit has said that, "if the author of the Tformation in football had been able to copyright it, the sport might
have come to an end instead of flourishing."' 10 7 Similarly, copyrighting
basic dance movements could destroy the customary foundation for
training dancers. Just as if youths were prevented from learning new
game strategies necessary to succeed at higher levels of competition by
an overzealous enforcement of an unwisely granted monopoly,
allowing the monopolization of individual movements (dance steps)
could seriously inhibit the future of the art form. Indiscriminately
expanded protection would be an unfortunate example of cutting off
the nose to spite the face.
Increasing commercialization of dance and its incumbent
profitability make the athletic analogy even more relevant. The
106. See Horgan v. Macmillan, 789 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1986) (deciding whether still
photographs of New York City Ballet's Nutcracker infringed the author's copyright in the
choreographic work). In deciding the case, the court assumed the existence of a valid copyright
under the existing statute. Id.; see also Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha
Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (focusing on choreography
copyright ownership in the employment relationship).
107. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
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American sports industry is a multibillion dollar enterprise, cornering
a significant share of broadcast attention. 0 8 Athletes often
successfully market themselves as brands. With great sums of money
at stake, individuals are highly motivated to seek to establish
ownership over the moves that made them rich and famous. The
potential monetary gain to the athlete who successfully copyrights his
or her signature move is huge, but the cost to society of granting this
monopoly would be crippling. 10 9 It would condone the imposition of
legal sanctions on all individuals who attempt to improve their own
athletic performance by emulating their heroes, while certain athletes
would stand to make a lot of money in licensing fees. While savvy
lawyers could conceivably manipulate such movements to fit within
the statute as fixed choreographic works after the games are
broadcast, there seems to be a gut feeling within the judiciary that
this type of monopoly would not promote progress. Thus, judges deny
copyright to athletic performance in its pure form on the basis that
"[a] claim of being the only athlete to perform a feat doesn't mean
much if no one else is allowed to try."' 10
Proponents of copyrighting these types of individual
accomplishments in movement have pointed to the Seventh Circuit's
footnoted suggestion that "players' performances" contain the "modest
However, the court's
creativity required for copyrightability."'
comments on originality came in the context of whether a broadcast of
a sporting event was sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection, not whether individual athletic performance could or
should be copyrightable. 112 In terms of copyright, a broadcast of a
sporting event is fundamentally different from the underlying athletic
event: the broadcaster makes selection and arrangement choices, such
as how to position the cameras that record the action, that qualify the

108. The estimated value of the American sports industry in 2011 was $422 billion. Sports
Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RES., LTD., http://www.plunkettresearch.com/
sports%20recreation%201eisure%20market%20researchlindustry%20statistics (last visited Mar.
10, 2012).
109. There would certainly be enforcement issues related to an athlete exercising rights to
prohibit others from performing his or her signature move: it would be quite difficult to track
down each high school athlete who attempts to emulate his idol's moves. However, these
enforcement issues are outside of the scope of this Note.
110. Natl Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 846. Likewise, it is an empty accolade to be the only
person to achieve a specific contortion of the body, if the mover could immediately bar others
from ever performing that movement.
111. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1986).
112. Id.
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broadcast for treatment as an original work of authorship. Athletic
movements come into being in response to stimuli provided by thirdparty actors-both on the player-author's team and on the opposing
team. As such, there is an inherent reactionary element that
strengthens the argument against copyright protection. The analogy
between dance and athletics is not drawn to suggest that
choreography should not ever be copyrightable. Rather, it is meant to
demonstrate the dangers in providing overbroad copyright protection
to an art form built on a fundamental aspect of humanity: the ability
to move and the free will to pursue these movements to the limits of
individual physical ability.
Copyright law has historically guarded against manipulations
of the system that would result in effective monopolies of those things
termed "useful." Merger doctrine is one principle applied by the courts
to prevent the misuse of copyright to procure an unlimited
monopoly. 113 This principle denies protection when the idea and its
expression "merge," that is, when they become inseparable. This tenet
protects not only useful items such as mannequin figures, 114 but also
useful processes. 115 Athletic activities are often heralded as beneficial
for society, 1 6 and the value of this competition is judicially recognized:
Even where athletic preparation most resembles authorship-figure skating,
gymnastics, and, some would uncharitably say, professional wrestling-a performer who
conceives and executes a particularly graceful and difficult-or, in the case of wrestling,
feat cannot copyright it without impairing the underlying
seemingly painful-acrobatic
117
competition in the future.

Expanding copyright protection for choreographic works could have an
equally damaging future effect.
113. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) ("When the
uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic necessarily requires,' if not only
one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a
party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future
use of the substance. In such circumstances it does not seem accurate to say that any particular
form of expression comes from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the
subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We
cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated.") (internal
citations omitted).
114. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing
copyright protection to mannequins on the basis of their utilitarian function).
115. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) ("[T]here is a clear distinction between the
book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate.").
116. Campaigns urging children to get involved with sports have increased in recent years.
For example, the National Football League is heavily promoting its "Play 60" program. Play 60,
NFL RUSH, http://www.nflrush.com/play60/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
117. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Even parents who grew up wearing jerseys and cleats, a far cry
from tutus and pointe shoes, acknowledge the similarities between
dance and sports. 118 While the analogy may be anathema to some
dance theorists,1 1 9 the comparison illustrates a successful and
practical judicial approach to claims that could have derailed a
significant part of human life: the ability to use one's body to compete.
This need to use movement is heightened by the claim advanced by
Elsa Posey, a past president of the National Dance Education
Organization, that dance is an art not a sport, meaning "[i]n art, the
competition is within oneself."' 20 Copyright is meant to recognize the
reality that economic incentives are necessary to guarantee that
authors will find it worthwhile to turn their talents toward creating; it
is not meant to limit the ability to create. In order to advance creation
of choreographic works, authors must be able to push the limits of
their minds and bodies without limitations on the steps they can
employ. Allowing the thick copyright protection advocated by some
theorists would undermine the customs of dance that made it a "useful
art" worth promoting.
The dance world has historically been a close-knit community
governed by a set of fluid customs that police the line between
respecting artistic integrity and contribution and allowing the
swapping of knowledge required to keep the art moving forward.' 2 1 In
order for the copyright law to fulfill its constitutional mandate, it must
find a way to promote that progress rather than hinder it.
B. Authorized Theft: Tap Dance's Tradition of Swapping Beats and
Stealing Steps
Most choreographic works through a significant portion of
American legal history lacked copyright protection. Choreographers
invented their own community norms to protect their intellectual

118. See, e.g., Erika Kinetz, Budding Dancers Compete, Seriously, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2OO5/O7/07/arts/dance/O7danc.html (" 'I played sports all my life, and
I've never seen anyone work as hard as they do,' said Dennis Spitzer, a physical therapist from
Fresno, Calif., who had come with his wife to watch their 10-year-old daughter, Lindsay, compete
at the Waldorf with the Dance Studio of Fresno. 'They are going out there to win. If they don't
win, they feel as badly as we do when we lose. It's not dance. It's a sport.'").
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Lakes, supra note 14, at 1830 (stating that, historically, protections against
unauthorized copying were successful because of the close-knit nature of the dance community).
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property. 122 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the tap dance
community. Celebrated "hoofer,"1 2 3 Ralph Brown referred to the
"artful knowledge" of stealing steps. 124 During the glory days of tap
dance in the first half of the twentieth century, there was no official
125 Not only
protection for choreographic works, let alone for tap steps.
were these steps left without legal protection, aspiring tap dancers
could not evolve without taking the initiative to emulate them. As
Brown recounted, "Once in a while you might get someone to show you
how to do a step, but not many that would take you by the hand and
carry you through it."126 The solution? 'You would just have to steal it.
1 27
That's the way it went."
This is not to say that no protections existed for the tap dance
innovator. As tap dancer Baby Laurence1 28 explained, "They watched
you like hawks and if you used any of their pet steps, they just stood
right up in the theater and told everybody about it at the top of their
voices."1 29 All dancers, choreographers, and performers received notice
that the most holy commandment of the tap community was 'Thou
shalt not copy anyone's steps-exactly." 130 This rule embodied both a
concern for protecting an individual's right to his or her creation and
an intense focus on improving the art form.
In today's globalized world, using a step "on the same stage" as
its originator becomes a stickier issue. For those authors who want to
protect their work, fixation and the attendant legal recognition
become more imperative. A good illustration is the recent controversy
surrounding performing artist Beyonc6's music video for her song
122. See generally RUSTY E. FRANK, TAP! THE GREATEST TAP DANCE STARS AND THEIR
STORIES 1900-1955 (recounting multiple versions of the freedom and limits of the ability to steal
others' steps); Singer, supra note 2 (describing the evolution of customs within the dance
community, which imposed its own sanctions for inappropriate uses of another's creations).
123. A "hoofer" is a tap dancer who trains and performs what is often perceived as "rhythm
tap."
124. FRANK, supra note 122, at 94.

125. Id. ("Dancers would watch each other with a keen, gleaning eye, ready to grab any and
all appealing steps. And if a dancer was good enough to figure out a tap step, it was for the
taking. There was no such thing as copyrighting a tap step.").
126. Id. at 97.
127. Id.
128. Tap Dance Hall of Fame: "Baby Laurence" Jackson, AM. TAP DANCE FOUND.,
http://atdf.org/awards/laurence.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (" 'Baby Laurence' Jackson has
been hailed as a jazz dancer of the rarest of rhythmic phenomena whose fluid beats, melodic
phrasings, and instrumentalized conceptions moved him in the category of jazz musician.").
129. MARK KNOWLES, TAP ROOTS: THE EARLY HISTORY OF TAP DANCING 207 (2002).
130. Id. at 207 ("Most dancers realized that 'stealing steps' from other dancers was the best
and quickest way to expand their own repertoire.").
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Countdown. She is accused, both by the press and by the
choreographer of the similar work, of infringing Belgian modern dance
choreographer Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker's copyright in her work
Rosas Danst Rosas and the filmed version of the same work,
Achterland.131 At this time, no one has filed a lawsuit, but this
incident presents a useful current example of the issues discussed in
this Section. The dance community has historically been quite open
and urges increased exposure to its art. However, as the world
shrinks, there is less space available where another artist can steal a
step and incorporate it into the artist's performance without infringing
on the original author's market. As De Keersmaeker stated in
response to the music video:
People asked me if I'm angry or honored. Neither. On the one hand, I am glad that
Rosas danst Rosas can perhaps reach a mass audience which such a dance performance
could never achieve, despite its popularity in the dance world since 1980s. And, Beyonc6
is not the worst copycat, she sings and dances very well, and she has a good taste! On
the other hand, there are protocols and consequences to such actions, and I can't
imagine she and her team are not aware of it. 132

The norms by which the dance community has historically policed
itself have a significant and relevant place, but copyright law helps to
level the playing field by providing a method of redress for those
whose artistic expression is commandeered to significant commercial
effect.
By requiring the affirmative step of fixation, modern copyright
law allows the dance community to easily manage and perpetuate the
large public domain that feeds the progress of the art form. No one is
required to fix her choreographic work. If the author feels strongly
about leaving it in the public domain, then no extra action is required,
unlike in the case of written works, where copyright protection
automatically attaches. 133 Although requiring an additional step for
legal protection might be described as onerous, this structure actually
respects and supports the artistic traditions of the dance community.
Given the importance of artistic expression within the field, this
satisfies an expressionist goal not met by a more expansively codified

131. See Matt Trueman, Beyonce Accused of 'Stealing' Dance Moves in New Video, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/stage/2011/oct/10beyonce-dance-movesnew-video.
132. Statement of Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker, ROSAS (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.rosas.
be/n]Inews/read-anne-teresa-de-keersmaekers-press -declaration-about-plagiarism-beyonc6s videoclip-countdow.
133. In the latter case, authors must take the extra step of "giving up" the rights they desire
to leave in the public domain through inclusion in the Creative Commons, among other methods.
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legal system. Allowing choreographers to decide what to fix and when
to fix it respects the creative concerns of choreographers more
substantially than imposition of government determinations of which
version best captures the artistic vision behind the work. If the
dancer-the artist's medium-makes a mistake, the choreographer
can throw out that version and protect another, better, copy. Due to
the fact that any dance relies on the ability of the dancers performing
it, removing this additional step would remove artistic control. This
removal is not likely to achieve copyright's goal of incentivizing
continued creativity.
IV. SYNCHRONIZING CHOREOGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT
The explicit inclusion of choreographic works in the 1976 Act is
a positive step. However, given the historical divergence between
theoretical intent and practical function, mere inclusion in the
discussion should not end the conversation. In the forty years since
choreographic works gained statutory recognition, many theories have
emerged professing to set forth the best way to resolve the problem of
copyright protection for choreographic works. This Part analyzes these
theories in light of the customs of the dance community, the purpose of
the copyright statute, and functional concerns undergirding the art
form at issue.
Although the passage of the 1976 Act opened the definition of
fixation to include "any tangible medium of expression, now or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device,"' 34 Labanotation and video recording are still the preferred
methods of fixation for choreographic works. 135 This arises mostly
from practical concerns of intelligibility-random scribbles, while
intelligible to their creator, may be incomprehensible to any other
human or machine. However, while copyright theorists find
Labanotation and video recording practical, both methods of fixation
arguably fail to preserve the essence of the work.
So then, is fixation serving the purpose of copyright? Is it
effectively promoting the progress of the art of dance? Given the 1976
Act's explicit recognition of choreographic works as a separate species
worth protecting, it is important to consider dance in its own right,

134. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
135. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FACTSHEET 119, supra note 100.
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rather than vis-A-vis more academically established art forms such as
music or literature.
The 1976 Copyright Act allows protection for any original work
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known
or later developed, 136 but the realities of dance as an art form cause
possible fixation methods for choreographic works to fall into
essentially two categories: notation (most commonly Labanotation)
and video recording. Each method has significant flaws that frustrate
dance theorists and legal commentators alike. Yet, when all the goals
of copyright are analyzed together, it becomes clear that the fixation
requirement for choreographic works should be preserved from a
theoretical standpoint and must be preserved from a practical
standpoint.
A. The Stabilizing Forceof Fixation
Movement is not created: it is found. As such, copyright law
should treat it like a preexisting fact waiting to be discovered. The
movement in a choreographic work is intimately tied to the motor
skills that form a significant part of what it means to be a human
being: moving one's arms in a balletic port-de-bra is very similar to
raising a hand to ask a question; a stylized run in a modern dance
piece is still fundamentally a run, akin to running to escape a
dangerous situation. To deny an able-bodied man the ability to move
his body in any way his physical makeup will allow would be to
drastically curtail a portion of the natural rights that we relate with
the ability of man to be free. By viewing movements as facts, it
becomes clear that only the specific selection and arrangement, as
fixed in a tangible medium of expression, should be copyrightable.1 37
The 1976 Copyright Act explicitly does not protect "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." 13S Individual steps should fall
within this prohibition. The fixation requirement documents the
selection and arrangement needed to move a choreographic work into
the realm of protection. This rewards originality in movement-based
art, while maintaining the necessary repertoire of public domain

136.
137.
only the
138.

17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (holding that
specific "selection and arrangement" of.facts may be accorded copyright protection).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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movement. As will be demonstrated below, other solutions proposed to
fix the relationship between copyright and choreographic works fail to
maintain the appropriate balance between protection of art and
preservation of publicly available movement.
One argument is that the fixation requirement overly restricts
choreographers and should be waived. 139 It is possible that the recent
trend of harmonization with international law will lead to an
elimination of fixation as a general requirement of copyright
protection. Slowly but surely, U.S. copyright law has let go of
formalities out of synch with Berne provisions. 140 However, given
Berne's explicit identification of fixation as an issue to be left to
member states,14 1 fixation seems fairly well entrenched in the
American copyright scheme. Failure to do so opens the door for
privatization of movement on a large scale. Even if it is true that
choreographers have consciously declined to take advantage of
available copyright protection, the increasing commercialization of
dance is likely to change this dynamic. Contestants on the Paula
Abdul-headed Live to Dance competed for $500,000--certainly enough
to litigate over.142
Growth of an artistic community can bring innovation and
progress, but it can also break down cultural norms. Legal
commentator Joi Lakes argues that choreographers will be less likely
to acquiesce to copying now that there are far more players who can
assert copyright protection. 43 Associate professor of dance at
University of Buffalo and the National Educational Chairman of
Dance Masters of America, Tom Ralabate, told the New York Times, "I
think the organizers of these competitions are thinking: 'This is a
business.' "144 The transition away from a small, self-policing artistic
community increases the necessity for a clear statutory framework.

139. Krystina Lopez de Quintana, Comment, The Balancing Act: How Copyright and
Customary Practices Protect Large Dance Companies over Pioneering Choreographers, 11 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 150, 171 (2004).
140. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 37, at 149 (discussing changes made to notice and
registration requirements for works distributed after adoption of the Berne Convention).
141. Berne Convention, supranote 39, at art. 2, 2.
142. About Live to Dance, CBS.cOM, http://www.cbs.com/primetimellivetodance/about/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2012).
143. Lakes, supra note 14, at 1860.
144. Kinetz, supra note 118, at El.
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Concern about monopoly creation undergirds American
copyright law. 145 This concern supports the need for a fixation
requirement for choreographic works in order to maintain an objective
marker for the line between publicly available movement and
privately owned art. Unlike a painter who transmits his vision from
his hand directly to the canvas (via the appropriate artistic tools), a
choreographer relies on living, breathing third parties to provide the
raw materials for her creations. 146 Dance is so subjective that we do
not want to award a monopoly covering every iteration dreamed up in
the head of the choreographer. If the door were open, choreographers
could make an (often good faith) argument that their dance included x,
y, and z visions in addition to the one performed at a given show.
Removing the fixation requirement would remove the guidepost for
determining exactly what is protected from unauthorized copying.
Fixation prevents an unscrupulous author from expanding his
monopoly by claiming his copyrightable work encompasses multiple
versions and combinations of movement rather than a set selection
and arrangement of steps as demonstrated by the fixed work.
Certainly there is a flipside to this argument: many
choreographers have a set artistic vision in their minds and have no
intention of manipulating copyright protection to gain rights to more
than this specific vision. For example, shortly before his death, Merce
Cunningham told friends that although his health was clearly fading,
he was still composing dances in his head. 47 Assuming these dances
were not fixed before his death, Cunningham's company has no legal
rights in the works. This is an economic and artistic loss to the
company, but the lack of fixation results in another, arguably greater
loss to society which will not be exposed to this work. Some legal
scholars argue that one of the main justifications for fixation is that it
preserves art and allows public exposure to the works.1 48 Given the
relative inconvenience of fixing a choreographic work, removing the
fixation requirement would create a substantial disincentive to fix
145. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967)
(explaining that merger doctrine is developed in order to prevent effective use of copyright to
acquire a monopoly in a useful object or process).
146. See Singer, supra note 2, at 305 ("A dance lives primarily through a dancer's
interpretation. The choreographer, therefore, will be vitally concerned with the circumstances
surrounding each performance of his work.").
147. Macaulay, supra note 13.
148. See Yoav Mazeh, Modifying Fixation: Why Fixed Works Need to be Archived to Justify
the Fixation Requirement, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 109, 122 (2008) ("The point that is suggested is
that society is not enriched by the fact that a work has been created. Rather, society is enriched
because it is exposed to, and interacts with, the work.").

20121

SQUARE DANCE

1289

works. While it is true that the very ephemeral nature of dance
contributes to its power as an art form, true social importance and
utility require that society have access to the work-able to interact
9
with it and absorb its significance.14
Interaction with previous works and ideas is key to progress:
"[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to
translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from
the foam of the sea."'150 Yet, arguments for strengthening copyright
protection are often premised on the idea that heightened copyright
protection is necessary to adjust the balance between the creative
individuals who bring new works into being and the greedy public who
hopes to free ride off these creations. 1 5' According to section 101 of the
1976 Act, "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when
its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration."1 52 The phrase "under the authority of the
author"' 53 means the author has ultimate artistic authority over what
is copyrighted. Locating the onus of fixation at the author provides a
safety valve that diminishes the impact of the traditional arguments
against fixation via video recording. An inherent worry with video
recording has been that it captures more than the work: it also codifies
154
any mistake made by the author's third-party medium, the dancer.
No choreographer wants his statutory work to contain an instance of a
dancer tripping and falling in the middle of his solo. Section 101
guards against this: a work is not fixed until the author says it is
fixed, so the author can choose to throw out versions with which he is
unsatisfied. In this instance, the Copyright Act internally provides an
argument in favor of fixation.
Some commentators suggest that copyright protection be
granted to all choreographic works regardless of fixation, with the
added requirement that a mandatory license be granted to all those

149. Id.
150. Jessica Litman, The PublicDomain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990).
151. Id.

152. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
153. Id.
154. See Lopez de Quintana, supra note 139, at 160 ("Video recordings often fail to capture
the choreographer's actual intent, since a film version of the work significantly depends on the
skill and accuracy of the dancer. A number of elements can go wrong: a dancer may miss a step,
execute the movement at a different angle, miss the rhythm or beat of the music, or fail to
capture an emotion.") (citation omitted).
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who are willing to pay. 15 5 A belief that all uses of copyrighted
materials must be affirmatively licensed by prospective users
negatively affects the preservation of materials documenting dance
legacy as well as the public's access to this part of its cultural history.
Dance education is already quite expensive, and costs would only rise
if teachers had to pay for the right to teach these movements, as they
tried to pass costs off to the final consumer. 156
The previous paragraphs laid out a theoretical justification for
preserving the fixation requirement. It is important to note the
extremely substantial practical concerns that also demand the
existence of a fixation requirement. Commentators agree that
choreography tends to be a nonlucrative field. 157 If fixation is not
required before infringement can be alleged, litigation over
choreographic works will be a battle of the experts. Expert testimony
is far more cost prohibitive than even notation. Contrary to legal
commentator Krystina Lopez de Quitana's argument that fixation
skews the field in favor of large dance companies, removing the
fixation requirement would eliminate small, less successful
choreographers from the discussion.18s It is far cheaper to play a
recording of the dance for the jury than to hire an expert to opine on
similarities or differences.
One of the most influential commentators on the intersection of
dance and copyright, Barbara Singer, wrote the first comprehensive
article on the intersection of copyright and choreographic works
shortly after the passage of the 1976 Act. 159 Singer felt that the dance
community's customs were a more effective protection than Congress's
solution and urged reliance on community norms rather than the
imperfect copyright regime. 16 0 However, the growth in the dance

155. In other words, these commentators urge lawmakers to import the concept of
mandatory licensing found in music to the realm of choreographic works.
156. Although it may strain credulity to imagine a lawsuit against a twelve-year-old ballet
student who is simply trying to improve her basic technical skills, the potentially lucrative
nature of infringement claims has led to some equally surprising lawsuits. See, e.g., Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (outlining a suit against
a mother who posted a YouTube video of her toddler dancing because a copyrighted Prince song
was faintly audible in the background).
157. See, e.g., Lakes, supra note 14, at 1854 (discussing the prohibitive cost of recording
choreography in written notation).
158. See Lopez de Quintana, supra note 139, at 159 (arguing that fixation methods are only
feasible for the few commercially successful dance companies).
159. See generally Singer, supra note 2.
160. See id. at 318 ("The time-honored custom of the dance community is therefore an
effective, yet sensitive means of preserving choreographic rights.").
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community occurring by the time Singer offered her solution has
taken a significant commercial turn in recent years. Fixation helps to
guard against commercially backed movement monopolies, but is also
flexible enough to allow room for the continued vitality of custom. The
more effective change to the current copyright system is to incentivize
creation through official recognition (via explicit statutory inclusion) of
the value of choreography separate from fixation, while requiring
fixation as a quid pro quo for the ability to enforce legal rights in the
work.
B. RetainingFixationand Fixing Creation
Congress should amend the 1976 Copyright Act to reflect the
reality that art has progressed in many directions and that often
creation and fixation are not simultaneous.161 It is appropriate for
Congress to require the extra step of fixation, but it must be
acknowledged that this imposes an extra step in the case of
choreographic works. While explicit statutory recognition of this added
burden on authors of choreographic works might not cause substantial
legal change, the principle behind recognition is vital. The purpose of
American copyright law is to encourage innovation. Not
acknowledging the reality of dance as it exists and evolves sends the
message to would-be choreographers that their contributions do not
matter. While there may not be a one-to-one correlation between the
wording of the copyright statute and the creation of choreographic
works, over time a poorly worded statute has the potential to severely
retard innovative progress.
The Copyright Act should be modified in order to move
choreographic works more squarely beneath the umbrella of protection
and to reflect the reality of the current status of those art forms that
Congress has termed the "useful arts." Section 101 of the Act defmes
creation in terms of fixation: "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a
copy or phonorecord for the first time."162 This language ignores the
fundamental difference between creation and protection of art.
The language of creation in the 1976 Copyright Act should be
amended to reflect the diversity of creative methods within the "useful

161. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining creation in terms of the moment of fixation). This
inappropriate linkage is the current copyright law's significant flaw with respect to its treatment
of choreographic works.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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arts." 163 Creation must be unlinked from fixation. It is fair to
acknowledge that creation is a term of art in the context of the 1976
Act. However, creation is also a normatively loaded term, connoting
164
the moment at which a person, idea, or work came into being.
Denying protection may be progress maximizing, but denying a work's
very existence hinders progress by implying that society does not find
the work worth acknowledging. Nothing in a utilitarian or moral
rights view suggests that it is necessary to pass this judgment. In fact,
even if it is appropriate to sort works into categories of protected and
unprotected, declaring that an art form by its very nature does not
exist will not incentivize creation within that art form. The
Constitution grants to Congress the authority to demand the extra
1 65 but
step of fixation as a quid pro quo for copyright protection,
Congress must acknowledge that it is an extra step. The
acknowledgment prevents trivialization of art forms that do not fit
easily into the one-size-fits-all language of the 1976 Copyright Act.
V. CODA: THE CURRENT CURTAIN CALL FOR COPYRIGHT AND DANCE

It is universally difficult to craft a rule, standard, or law that
effectively governs a wide variety of situations. Copyright law faces a
particularly difficult challenge because it attempts to balance the
competing interests of society and the individual. The ephemeral
nature of dance makes it tricky to define and more difficult to protect.
The fixation requirement in American law elicits especially loud
criticism from commentators on copyright protection for choreographic
works. Yet, despite the undeniable flaws of the system from the
perspective of the individual choreographer, fixation remains
supported by theoretical and practical concerns.
At the heart of copyright law is the goal of promoting progress
by striking the optimal balance between providing appropriate
economic incentive for creators through the granting of a limited
monopoly' 66 and maintaining a robust public domain for consumption

163. See generally id. § 102(a) (defining categories of "works of authorship").
164. For example, nearly every culture has its own version of a creation myth.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining Congress's authority to protect intellectual
property); Barry J. Swanson, The Role of Disclosure in Modern Copyright Law, 70 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 217, 218 (1988) (discussing the argument that the "fundamental policy"
of copyright law is the exchange of public knowledge for monopoly protection).
166. See Litman, supra note 150, at 969-70 (discussing the purpose of copyright law).

2012]

SQUARE DANCE

1293

for society at large. 167 In order to protect this balance, the 1976 Act
explicitly denies protection to "any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work."'168 Movement is universally and intrinsically tied to the
human condition. We arrive at movement in the way a traveler
reaches, rather than creates, his destination. As such, it is equivalent
to fact, and we should take care not to inappropriately increase the
legal monopoly available to compilers of movement.
Fixation moves choreography from the realm of the theoretical
to the concrete. It provides an economic and artistic incentive to
artists that preserves the public's natural right to discover movement
for themselves. Restricting copyright protection to works that are
fixed does not deprive choreographers of the rights most dear to them:
169
control over how, when, and by whom the work is performed.
Rather, it allows the choreographer to designate an official version of
his artistic vision while also protecting his economic rights. A work is
not fixed unless the fixation was established under the authority of
the author. 70 This provision supports the desire of the choreographer
for ultimate artistic control, particularly important in this case
because the medium is a third party.
Maintaining the current fixation requirement for dance while
modifying the language of the Copyright Act to reflect the reality that,
for some art forms, fixation is an additional step independent of
creation will not change the fact that copyright law uncomfortably
straddles the line between what it is meant to do and what it does in
practice. By its very nature as a noncriminal branch of the law,
intellectual property disputes require significant sums of money to
litigate successfully. However, the playing field is inherently unequal;

167. See id. at 977 ("[A] vigorous public domain is a crucial buttress to the copyright system;
without the public domain, it might be impossible to tolerate copyright at all .... ").
168. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
169. See Singer, supra note 2, at 305 ("The choreographer, therefore, will be vitally
concerned with the circumstances surrounding each performance of his work.").
170. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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preserving the fixation requirement levels, rather than exacerbates,
this inequality. American copyright law can recognize dance as an art
form without sacrificing the goals of copyright or severely limiting the
public domain. Once the law acknowledges that creation can occur
independent of fixation, choreographers can move forward as equals
on the copyright stage and can make a real decision about whether to
collaborate with the law or remain a soloist.
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